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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : 
Vs. : 
FRANK LYLE DOMINGUEZ : Case No. 20010649-CA 
" ~~ ~~ BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for Murder a first-degree felony. This 
court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to ! ' C \. § 78-2A-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POl 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
RULING TO ALLOW TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENDANTS 
PRISON RECORD AND PAROLE STATUS? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was preserved for appeal when a 
pretrial motion was made, argued, and ruled or ]- the trial en.:. ,-• the 23rd da\ of 
May 2001. (R 201/pgs. 9-16). This Court reviews this issue with a standard of 
"abuse of discretion . i-owever, "admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be 
scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper exercise of that discretion". 
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State v. Decorso, 993 P.2na 837,843 (Utah 1999). Decorso requires the trial court to 
apply a two-prong analysis. First, the trial court must determine whether the 
evidence is being offered for a proper noncharacter purpose. Second, the trial court 
must determine whether the evidence tends to prove some fact material to the crime 
charged, and whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice. 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
ALLOWING INTO EVIDENCE TESTIMONY THAT THE 
DEFENDANT VIOLATED PRISON RULES, COMMITTED 
PAROLE VIOLATIONS, AND OTHER IMPROPER 
CHARACTER REFERENCES ? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was not preserved for appeal, but 
should be ruled to be plain error. The Court would then review these prejudicial 
statements under a plain error standard. In the case of State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 
1010 (Utah App. 1994) this Court held "Under [the plain error] standard, we will not 
reverse unless we determine that an error existed, and that the error was both 
obvious and harmful". 
POINT III 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
ALLOWING HEARSAY TESTIMONY BY DETECTIVE 
WELOTH OF STATEMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY 
TERESA BROWN? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW: This ISSUU v\^ preserved with an objection b> 
defense counse- (R 203/pg 121) Normally, a trial court has broad discretion to 
admit or exclude evidence and its determination typically will only be disturbed if it 
constitutes an abuse of discretion, .y./.'c • n tunic, v.V'- i' _ J :_.•.•*••:• :A> . vv-
 :see 
also State v. Perm, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994)). However, the Supreme Court in 
the case of State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1222 (Utah 1993) held that "when the 
evidentiary ruling at issue is an independent legal issue and does not involve the 
balancing of factors, we review the determination H >r correctness". This issue should 
therefore be reviewed for correctness. The defendant however Y.os ^~~ v-?rdcn or 
showing at least tlk iikehhood v prejudice. bee Mat<. \. Johnson, N- •' 
favorable result for the defendant.) 
POINT IV 
DID THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENY THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER EVIDENCE 
OF PLEA NEGOTTATTOV WAS PRESENTED T O TTIF TTTJV? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue was preserved for appeal by trial 
Court] reviews a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion." 
State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837, 84o (L'ui: i'J^j). Abuse of discretion occurs when 
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"a review of the record show that the court's decision is plainly wrong in that the 
incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a 
fair trial."(id at 846), (See also State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Utah 
1997). 
POINT V 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERRORS DISCUSSED IN POINTS I-
IV ABOVE CONSTITUTE HARMFUL, AND THEREFORE 
REVERSIBLE, ERROR? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The preservation of the issue for appeal was 
discussed in Points I-IV above. For this court to find an error harmful it must 
determine that there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome absent 
the error. State v. Knight ll\ P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
RULE 404. CHARACTER EVIDENCE NOT ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE 
CONDUCT; EXCEPTIONS; OTHER CRIMES 
(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait 
of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered 
by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the 
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, 
or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first 
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aggressor; 
(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided 
in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence offered under this rule is 
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of 
Rules 402 and 403. 
RULE 410. INADMISSIBILITY OF PLEAS, PLEA DISCUSSIONS, AND 
RELATED STATEMENTS 
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in 
any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made the 
plea or was a participant in the plea discussions: 
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn; 
(2) a plea of nolo contendere; 
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under > Rule 11 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable state procedure regarding 
either of the foregoing pleas; or 
(4) any statement made, in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for 
the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a 
plea of guilty later withdrawn. 
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein another 
statement made in the course of the same plea or plea discussions has been 
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introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously 
with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement if the statement 
was made by the defendant under oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel. 
RULE 804. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; DECLARANT UNAVAILABLE 
(a) Definition of Unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes 
situations in which the declarant: 
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from 
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement; or 
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then 
existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or 
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant's statement 
has been unable to procure the declarant's attendance by process or other reasonable 
means. 
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if the exemption, refusal, claim of lack of 
memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the 
proponent of the declarant's statement for the purpose of preventing the witness 
from attending or testifying. 
(b) Hearsay Exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule 
if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(5) Other Exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence 
of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is 
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of 
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a 
6 
statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes 
known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide 
the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's 
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and 
address of the declarant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by information with one count of murder, and 
was tried before a jury on May 29, May 31, June 1, June 4 and June 6 2001 before a 
jury empaneled by the Honorable W. Brent West. The jury found the Defendant 
guilty of the count of murder, with a firearm enhancement. On July 10, 2001 the 
Defendant was sentenced to serve a term of not less than six years and which may 
be for life at the Utah State Prison , the sentence to be served concurrent with the 
sentence the Defendant is now serving. 
At trial the following witnesses testified concerning the case: 
Several witnesses were called to testify that a murder occurred and the 
evidence obtained at the scene. A gunpowder expert found a great deal of 
gunpowder at the scene, but nothing other than an insignificant trace in the left 
pocket of the defendant, which would be inconsistent with an individual who pulled 
the trigger. 
Ricarla Dominguez, the defendant's grandmother testified of a confused and 
questionable confession. John Dominguez, the defendant's uncle, testified of a 2-
7 
day drinking binge, and a confession by the defendant at the end of that two day 
period. 
Detective Weloth testified concerning hearsay testimony of a Teresa Brown, 
who told him the defendant confessed to killing one person, then three people. And 
Detective Minor testified as to a confession by the defendant in which he first 
blamed a girl named Amore, then a girl named Tonya, and then himself for the 
murder. They testified he went with them to the scene and reenacted the crime and 
showed them where he had put his hand on a column. He also told and showed 
them where they should find the gloves and the gun, but none were ever found. The 
defendants parole status, together with details of his absconding and parole 
violations was also obtained from this and other witnesses. 
Detective Lucas then testified concerning the defendants plea negotiation 
wherein he agreed to plead guilty to murder in exchange for a TV in his cell and 
charges against a friend being dropped. This testimony was ruled inadmissible and 
ordered disregarded by the jury. 
Two correctional officer from the State prison testified concerning the prison 
status of the defendant, together with evidence that he had violated prison rules, was 
homicidal and suicidal, and that he had his clothing cut off him on a suicide watch. 
He then made a statement that he would kill the officer like he had the other M 
F-—. 
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Finally, Officer Gallegos testified of a drive by shooting of a dwelling, which 
occurred in 1996. In this case now on appeal there was evidence submitted to the 
jury that the Defendant on the day of the shooting was a user of controlled 
substances. However, the State admitted that it conducted no tests to determine at 
the time of the alleged confession whether the Defendant was under the influence of 
controlled substances, thereby making his confession involuntary. 
At the conclusion of the case the jury found the Defendant guilty of one count 
of murder, a first-degree felony, enhanced by the use of a firearm. The Judge 
sentenced the Defendant to serve a term of not less than six years and which may be 
for life at the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
By information that Defendant was charged with one count of murder, a first 
degree felony in violation of Section 76-5-203 U.C.A. To that charge, the Defendant 
entered a plea of not guilty. 
On May 23, 2001, a pretrial conference was held. (R 201) At that hearing the 
State requested a ruling on two issues relevant to this appeal. First, the State 
requested a ruling authorizing them to introduce evidence that the Defendant had a 
felony arrest warrant based upon an absconding charge and upon a parole violation. 
(R 201/pg 10) The State also wanted permission to inform the jury that the 
Defendant was a parolee. (R 201/pg 11) Second, the State requested a ruling 
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allowing them to introduce evidence that the Defendant was housed at the Utah 
State Prison. (R 201/pg 11). They further wanted to inform the jury that he was 
involved in "an administrative function" and then threatened the correctional 
officers. (R 201/pg 12) Defense counsel objected and the court ruled that both 
issues could be raised to the jury. (R 201/ pgs 13-16) 
The trial was held on May 29, May 31, June 1, June 4 and June 6, 2001 and 
the following witnesses were called: 
The State called as its witness the Defendant's grandmother, Ricarla 
Dominguez. (R 203/pg. 74) The witness testified that at her home at 2362 Monroe 
Blvd, in Ogden, Utah she and her husband held a party that started on Saturday the 
14th of October, 2000 and continued into Sunday, the 15th of October. The 
Defendant was present at the party. The State asked if the witness knew what time 
the Defendant left her house. The witness stated that she had called the police at 
approximately 3:00 p. m. because her husband and grandson were fighting and the 
Defendant left before the police arrived. (R 203/pg 75) Counsel for the State asked 
the witness if that was the second time the Defendant left. The witness replied that 
he did not leave the first time. Counsel for the State asked the witness if she had not 
told Detective Lucas that her.grandson had left at about noon the first time, and the 
witness denied telling the Detective that her grandson had left at noon. (R 203/ pgs 
75-76) 
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Counsel for the State showed a statement Mrs. Dominguez had previously 
signed for Detective Lucas and asked her if she remembered signing the statement, 
to which the witness replied, "Yes." However, when counsel for the State asked the 
witness, " If she remembers telling Detective Lucas that Little Franky had taken off 
by noon and her response again was yeah", The witness responded: "She did not 
remember saying that." (R 203/pg 78) Counsel for the Defendant requested that the 
witness be provided a copy of the statement she allegedly signed and counsel for the 
State provided her a copy of the statement. When counsel for the State asked if that 
was her signature, the witness replied, "I don't know how to read." (R 203/pg 79) 
In response to a question by counsel for the Defendant as to whether she 
spoke English the witness , Mrs. Dominguez, replied, "Yeah, a little bit." (R 203/ 
pg 82) Counsel for the State then asked the witness when was the first time the 
Defendant left the house on October 15, 2000 and the witness replied, "I told him he 
left at three." One of the final questions asked by counsel for the State was whether 
the witness recalled the Defendant leaving the house before three p.m. and the 
witness replied, " No, because he was helping us clean the house." (R 203/pg 85) 
Counsel for the Defendant asked the witness if she recalled if the Defendant 
had ever admitted to doing something he had not done, and the witness replied, 
"yes." When counsel for the Defendant asked the witness for specific instances 
where the Defendant had made things up, the witness replied, " He makes things up 
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and they are not true. Also when the Defendant came back from prison they were 
giving him that medicine and it made him different. I noticed that he was different 
and he made a lot of lies". (R 203/pg 87-88) 
The State called the Defendant's uncle, John Dominguez, to testify (R 203/pg 
100). John Dominguez testified that the Defendant, in response to a news report 
about the Boulevard Market shooting, stated that he had shot the guy in the store. (R 
203/pgs 102-103). On cross examination the witness admitted he had been drinking 
constantly for two days before this confession. (R 203/pg 107) He stated he had 
drank approximately a couple of 12 ounce cans an hour. (R 203/pg 107) On the day 
in question he began drinking at 8:00 a.m. (R 203/pg 108) 
The record indicates that prior to calling Teresa Brown to the stand, Detective 
Weloth and Prosecutor Brandon Maynard had a conversation with Ms. Brown 
concerning her testimony. At that point she informed Weloth and Maynard that she 
would refuse to testify due to threats, by a person named Juanita, at the prison. (R 
203/pgs 122-123) 
Nothwithstanding this knowledge, the State then called Teresa Brown as its 
witness. Ms Brown at the time of the testimony was an inmate at the Utah State 
Prison. (R 203/pg. 115) Ms Brown testified that she knew the Defendant as Rita's 
nephew. (R 203/pg. 116) Counsel for the State then asked the witness, "In the 
course of that ride, what statements did this Defendant make to you about the 
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activities he had been engaged in?' The witness replied , "I don't want to say." 
When counsel for the State asked, "Why is that, Ma'am" the witness again replied, 
"I don't want to say." Counsel for the State then requested the Court to instruct the 
witness to answer. The Court told the witness that she was going to have to answer 
that question, yes or no. When the witness was asked if she had a conversation with 
Detective Weloth, the witness answered, "yes." (R 203/pgs 116-119) 
Counsel for the State then asked the witness, " What did you tell Detective 
Weloth about what you knew about what this Defendant had told you?" The 
witness replied, "My lawyer told me not to even say nothing, your honor. If it's 
going to get me in trouble then I guess I'm in trouble, but I don't want to say 
nothing." (R203/pg. 117) 
At this point, counsel for the State requested that Court find the witness in 
contempt. (R 203/pg. 118) The Court asked the witness if she was going to answer 
the questions, and the witness replied, "no." The Court then found her in contempt. 
(R 203/pg. 119) 
The jury was then excused and Counsel for State requested that the Court 
make a finding that based upon her refusal to answer the questions, in spite of the 
contempt, that she become unavailable so the State could put on her prior statement 
to Detective Weloth. Counsel for the Defendant disagreed with the request that the 
witness be found unavailable. (R 203/pg. 121) 
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The Court made a specific finding under U.R.E. Rule 804 that she was 
unavailable. The Court then ruled that the State was allowed at this point to call 
Detective Weloth and had him relate those statements. Again Counsel for the 
Defendant objected to the ruling of the Court. (R 203/pgs 127-128) 
In accordance with the Court's ruling the State called Detective Weloth as its 
next witness. (R 203/pg. 131) In response to the State's question as to what the 
witness, Brown, had related to him, Detective Weloth stated that the Defendant told 
her that he had killed someone, that he had a gun, although they never saw a gun, 
and again, was insistent about getting a ride. (R 203/pgs 133-134) When questioned 
further by the State Detective Weloth testified that the witness stated, 
" That at one point he changed and said that he had killed three people but later 
changed that back to he had killed one person." These statements were allegedly 
made in the ride to Roy and back. (R 203/pg. 134) 
The State called as one of its witnesses Shane Minor, now an investigator for 
the Weber County Attorney's office. At the time of the incident Mr. Minor was a 
detective with the Ogden City Police Department. (R 204/pgs 83-84) 
Mr. Minor participated in the investigation of the homicide at the market 
located at 27th Street and Washington Blvd in Ogden, Utah on the 15th of October 
2000. (R 204/pg 86) On the 19th of October, 2000 Mr. Minor was requested to 
interview the Defendant at the Ogden City Police Department. (R 204/pgs 87-88) 
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At the start of the interview the Defendant confirmed to Mr. Minor that he had some 
information about who had committed the homicide on the 15th at the Boulevard 
Market. First the Defendant stated that a girl by the name of Amore told him that 
she had shot a guy in the market. (R 204/pg 89) 
Mr. Minor continued to ask the Defendant as to where he had gained the 
information and exactly what was said. (R 204/pgs 90-91) Mr. Minor began to 
question the Defendant's story because he indicated that first Amore went to the 
market at 7:00 a.m., but he did not believe the market was open at this time. (R 204/ 
pg. 93) 
Later the Defendant told Mr. Minor that he had driven a girl by the name of 
Tonya to the market, and Tonya went into the market and when she came out she 
told the Defendant that she had shot the victim. (R 204/pgs 100-101) At this time 
Mr. Minor was informed that Tonya was in the Weber County jail at the time of the 
incident. When Mr. Minor showed the Defendant a picture of Tonya and informed 
him that she was in the Weber County jail at the time of the incident, the 
Defendant became teary eyed and said "I went in and shot the guy". Mr. Minor 
further questioned the Defendant and the Defendant provided further details of the 
incident. (R 204/pgs 101-104) 
After the Defendant had confessed to the crime, Mr. Minor asked the 
Defendant if anyone had given him the Miranda warning and the Defendant said 
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nobody had. (R 204/pg 106) Then the Defendant asked for another cigarette and a 
drink, and for the first time Mr. Minor gave the Defendant the Miranda rights, which 
Mr.. Minor testified the Defendant waived and then the police typed a written 
statement which the Defendant signed. (R 204/pgs 106-108) 
The State called Detective David Lucas of the Ogden City Police Department 
to testify that while the Defendant was incarcerated in the Weber County jail he 
initiated a conversation with the jailers to the effect that he was willing to plead 
guilty to the first degree murder. Prior to the testimony of the willingness of the 
Defendant to enter a plea, counsel for the Defendant questioned Officer Lucas if he 
knew at this point that the Defendant had been appointed an attorney. Officer Lucas 
testified that he believed that the Defendant had been appointed an attorney. (R 205/ 
Pg31) 
With the jury present, defense counsel raised the issue as to whether the 
Defendant's alleged confession in the Weber County jail was an attempt at a plea 
negotiation. The Defendant argued that this conversation was a plea negotiation and 
not a confession. Counsel for the State argued that the Defendant was making a 
confession. The Court then excused the jury. (R 205/pg 33) 
The Court reviewed the arguments of both the State and the Defendant as to 
whether this was a plea negotiation and not a confession. The Court ruled that under 
U.R.E. Rule 410 there is a prohibition of any kind of a discussion of a plea 
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negotiation before the jury. The Judge made a finding that these statements 
constituted a plea negotiation as defined by Rule 410 and granted the Defendant's 
motion to exclude the testimony regarding the alleged confession in the Weber 
County jail. (R 205/pgs 36-37) 
Counsel for the Defendant moved for a mistrial based on the testimony of 
Detective Lucas before the jury as the alleged confession was prejudicial to the 
Defendant. Counsel for the State argued that prejudice is not the test. The Court 
denied the Defendant's motion based on the fact that Defendant's counsel solicited 
the testimony during his voir dire. The Court stated that was a risk the Defendant 
assumed when he questioned the witness. (R 205/pgs 37-38) 
The State called as its witnesses Doug Cook and Dustin Hardcastle, a 
correctional officer and a sergeant at the Utah State Prison. Both Officers testified 
that on the 10 day of April, 2001 the Defendant was subject to an offender 
management review. This is a review to determine if the Defendant should stay 
within the housing unit or due to prison behavior violations, be moved to a different 
housing unit. (R 205/pg 43) The Defendant informed the control room that he 
would like to speak to a crisis worker. The Defendant was taken to the South 
conference room in the presence of the officer and sergeant. At the request of the 
mental health worker the officers cut off Defendant's clothing so he would have 
nothing that could harm the Defendant or others. (R 205/pg 44) Both officers 
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testified that the Defendant said: "Cook, some day I'll get my hands on you and kill 
you like I did that other motherfucker." (R 205/pgs 45, 51) There was no objection 
at this time to this testimony by counsel for the Defendant. 
The Defense called as its witnesses Frank Dominguez, Sr. and Frank 
Dominguez Jr. Both testified that they attended a birthday party that began on the 
14th of October 2000. At the party both consumed large amounts of beer and other 
hard liquors. (R 205/pgs 86-87) The party went all night and they had to put the 
Defendant to bed, because the Defendant was drunk. (R 205/pgs 88-89) The 
Defendant's grandmother got the Defendant up at approximately 8:00 a.m. on 
Sunday to help clean up the house. The witnesses said they saw the Defendant all 
the time and the Defendant did not leave the house until the police came because the 
grandfather and father were arguing. (R 205/pgs 90-91) 
The Defense called as its expert witness Dr. Robert Rothfeder. (R 205/pg 
106) The witness testified on the effect that various drugs had on an individual. (R 
205/pgs 107-110) However, the witness testified that he had never examined the 
Defendant (R 205/pgs 111,116). 
As a rebuttal witness the State called Rocky Gallegos, a police officer for 
Ogden City. The witness testified that in 1996 he investigated a drive-by shooting 
of a dwelling. In June 1996 the witness talked to the Defendant about the incident. 
The Defendant was willing to talk to the Officer and indicated that a Shane and 
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Jerome had done the shooting. (R 205/pgs 32-35) Later the Defendant changed his 
story and admitted that he did the shooting. (R 205/pgs 37-38) The testimony was 
admitted without objection from counsel for the Defendant. 
On June 6, 2001, the jury found the Defendant guilty of murder a 1st degree 
felony. (R 206/167) 
On July 10, 2001 Judge W. Brent West sentenced the Defendant to serve a 
term of not less than six years and which may be for life on the first degree felony. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This case is a first-degree murder conviction, which conviction was obtained, 
to a great extent, through a series of prejudicial and inadmissible evidence. The 
case, from the beginning, was one in which the State had very little substantive 
evidence, and although there was no question that the victim was murdered, the 
issue became the identity of the murderer. The investigation revealed no evidence 
to tie any one individual to the crime. The State, in essence, based its case, on a 
number of alleged confessions by the defendant. The problem with these 
confessions was that they were contradictory and to some extent unreliable. 
To bolster these confessions, the State then began to push the evidentiary 
envelope. This began with a pretrial request to allow significantly prejudicial 
evidence concerning the defendants prison and parole history. The trial court made 
its first error in ruling this evidence was admissible. 
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Next, the State, knowing that the witness would refuse to testify, called 
Teresa Brown, whose testimony was not only improper, but also extremely 
prejudicial. When she fulfilled her promise to the prosecutor not to testify, the State 
then asked the trial court to allow the hearsay testimony of Det. Weloth. In another 
incorrect ruling, the trial court admitted inadmissible and prejudicial hearsay 
testimony. 
The State then introduced evidence of the most damaging nature, a plea 
negotiation statement that the defendant would plead guilty to murder. This 
evidence was ruled by the trial court to be in direct violation of U.R.E. Rule 410, 
and was ordered stricken. The next error, however, was a refusal to grant the 
defense motion for mistrial. 
Finally, the court, consistent with its former erroneous ruling, allowed the 
State to delve into explicit details of the defendant's stay and problems at the Utah 
State Prison, and his status and problems as a parolee. The court also allowed 
detailed evidence of a prior drive-by shooting of a dwelling. 
The fact that the State produced no direct or circumstantial evidence tying the 
defendant to the crime was of little consequence, since the jury had been so 




DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
RULING TO ADMIT TESTIMONY OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
PRISON RECORD AND PAROLE STATUS? 
A pretrial conference was held on May 23, 2001 at which time the court, 
among other things addressed the issue of whether or not testimony concerning the 
defendant's prison record and his parole status would be admissible in trial. The 
State, over the defendant's objection, requested the admission of this information 
under two separate rulings. First, the State requested the court allow testimony 
regarding the defendants prison status. This was proposed under the proposition that 
this was necessary to introduce evidence that the defendant had made a statement on 
April 10th 2001 in front of two prison correctional officers in which he stated 
"someday I'll get my hands on you and kill you like I did that other mother f- ."* 
Second, the State requested that the court allow testimony that the defendant was a 
1
 This evidence included information that the defendant was in the maximum-security facility at the prison, that he 
was under a review of his behavior, that he was under a mental health watch for suicide, and that the two officers were 
forcibly removing his clothing. 
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parolee, and was picked up on the night of the confessions for an outstanding 
absconding warrant. 
The trial court, without making any findings, determined that both statements 
would be allowed into evidence. The prosecution, given this ruling, elicited 
testimony from several witnesses regarding not only the fact that the defendant had 
been in prison and on parole, but expanded on this information to include numerous 
prejudicial references. 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of evidence provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. In other worlds, evidence offered under this rule is 
admissible if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirements of 402 ad 403. 
The evidence in question was presumably introduced for the purpose of showing 
foundation. The State in their motion argument claimed "Obviously, in putting on 
[the defendants confession] evidence, there would need to be some explanation as to 
how it is we found the defendant and how it is that conversation got started". They 
further argued that the prison information was also necessary foundation evidence.3 
2
 This evidence also included evidence that the defendant was wanted by the parole authorities, that he had absconded, 
and that he was hiding from the police and parole authorities. 
3
 The prosecution argued on May 23 2001 that "Obviously we cannot put those people on and go through any type of 
a foundation of who they are and where they work and how this statement came about without disclosing that the 
defendant's being housed at the Utah State Prison." 
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The Supreme Court has struggled with the rule of other crime evidence under 
Rule 404(b) in recent years. The Court in 1997 issued the opinion of State v. 
Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997) and then in 1999 issued the opinion of State v. 
Decorso, 993 P.2d 837 (Utah 1999) in which they reassessed and to some extent 
overruled Doporto. 
In the case of State v. Decorso, the Court held "admission of prior crimes 
evidence itself must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper exercise 
of that discretion." (id at 843) The court then described the required two-pronged 
analysis the trial court must utilize in making a ruling on this issue. First, the trial 
court must determine whether the evidence is being offered for a proper 
noncharacter purpose. Second, the trial court must determine whether the evidence 
tends to prove some fact material to the crime charged, and whether its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, (id at 843,844) 
In the present case, the trial court did neither. Conceivably it could be argued 
that the court followed and agreed with the State's representation that it was to be 
offered for foundation purposes. The problem is that foundation is not one of the 
listed non-character purposes in 404(b). If this Court determines that foundation 
falls within the parameters of "other purposes", there still exists the problem that the 
record is absolutely devoid of any analysis under Rule 403 of the prejudicial effect 
that this evidence would have on the defendant in the minds of the jury. Such an 
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analysis is required both under Rule 404(b) as well as by State v. Decorso and its 
progeny.4 
If this Court finds that the trial court committed error in its ruling on the 
admissibility of this evidence, the court must then determine whether or not that 
error was harmful. To eliminate duplication, a discussion of the harmful effect of 
this evidence as well as other evidence will be discussed in Point VI below. 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT PLAIN ERROR IN 
ALLOWING INTO EVIDENCE TESTIMONY THAT THE 
DEFENDANT VIOLATED PRISON RULES, COMMITTED 
PAROLE VIOLATIONS, AND OTHER IMPROPER 
CHARACTER REFERENCES? 
There is an issue as to whether Defense counsel properly preserved, through 
timely objections, each instance of the prejudicial character evidence testimony 
elicited by the State through a number of witnesses. There is clearly an argument 
that the pretrial hearing of May 23, 2001 decided this issue, and the defense was left 
to observe the damage such a ruling had on their case. If, on the other hand, this 
Court believes that the State went beyond the parameters of the trial court's ruling, 
then we have a situation in which the defense counsel failed to timely object. In that 
4
 See also State v.Colwell 994 P.2d 177 (Utah 2000) where the Prosecution committed error in inquiring into the 
particulars of the defendants previous convictions which were divulged in his direct examination. 
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event, the defendant must show plain error that the trial court should have caught 
and corrected.5 
The defendant would argue that this Court need not review this issue under 
the plain error standard, since defense was following the trial courts ruling of May 
23, 2001 and therefore did not need to object to each instance that the State asked 
questions regarding these subjects. Defense counsel should be able to rely on the 
courts ruling once a decision has been made. To require counsel to thereafter object 
to each portion of testimony only reinforces to the jury the damage to the defendant. 
Trial counsel should not be put into a position of having to decide either to preserve 
the record on appeal or to try to win the case by minimizing the damage through 
silence. 
Assuming arguendo that defense counsel failed to properly preserve these 
issues for appeal, this Court would then review these prejudicial statements under a 
plain error standard. In the case of State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 
1994) this Court held "Under [the plain error] standard, we will not reverse unless 
we determine that an error existed, and that the error was both obvious and 
harmful". The Court further ruled "An error is harmful if the likelihood of a 
different result is 'sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict.'" (id at 
1010/ This Court, in the case of State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819, 821 (Utah App. 
5
 See State v. Olsen 869 P. 2d 1004 (Utah App. 1994). 
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1990) has held; "Generally, inquiry into the details of prior convictions has been 
found to be so prejudicial as to amount to plain error". This Court further observed, 
"In such cases, the court will reach the issue on appeal despite the lack of 
objection". (Id. at 821). See also United States v. Roenigk, 810 F.2d 809, 814 (8th 
Cir. 1987). 
In the present case defendant would submit that the errors were both obvious 
and harmful. Examining first the prison guard incident, there is clearly an issue as to 
whether the State, under the guise of foundation, flooded the jury with extraneous 
and damaging information. This evidence included information that the defendant 
was in the maximum-security facility at the prison, that he was under a review of his 
behavior, that he was under a mental health watch for suicide, that the defendant 
was feeling homicidal, and that the two officers were forcibly removing his clothing. 
None of this information was necessary to set forth a foundation for his statement. 
Furthermore, this information was elicited twice, by two separate officers. Further 
proof that this information was being used by the State for improper purposes is a 
review of the prosecutors closing statement. Mr. Heward states: "...Defendant 
housed at the Utah State Prison. April 10th. Situation arises. Defendant gets upset. 
When asked by correctional officers Cook and Hardcastle, are you feeling suicidal 
or homicidal: 'I'm feeling homicidal...'" (R day five page 137). The prejudicial 
effect of this information is obvious. 
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The second series of questions under examination includes numerous 
references to the defendant's parole status. This evidence also included evidence 
that the defendant was wanted by the parole authorities, that he had absconded, and 
that he was hiding from the police and from the parole authorities. Although it can 
be argued that proper foundation for his early statements required mention of the 
parole status, there is no question that presenting to the jury the fact he had 
absconded and was hiding from the authorities was clearly utilized for prejudicial 
effect.6 
Furthermore, the State had Officer Rocky Gallegos testify as to a drive-by 
shooting of a dwelling that in 1996 the defendant admitted to committing. Although 
the State could argue this was admitted to show the defendant has a habit or practice 
of changing his stories, the details of the shooting were explored before the jury. 
Finally, the argument as to the harmful effect to the defendant will be discussed 
more fully in Point VI below. 
POINT III 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
ALLOWING HEARSAY TESTIMONY BY DETECTIVE 
WELOTH OF STATEMENTS ALLEGEDLY MADE BY 
TERESA (TERRY) BROWN? 
The prosecutor demonstrates his non foundational use of this information by referring to it in closing arguments in a 
totally different context. Mr. Heward says, "We know the defendant initially lies to police about who he is. And then 
we find out he lies to them because he's on the run from a parole violation, or at least [that's] what he says", 
(transcript closing page 129) 
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Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides certain exceptions to the 
hearsay rules normal exclusion of hearsay evidence. That rule provides in parts 
relevant to this discussion as follows: 
Rule 804 
(a) Definition of unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes 
situations in which the declarant: 
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the 
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or 
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's 
statement; 
In the present case, the defendant would concede that the trial court was 
correct in ruling that Teresa Brown was unavailable to testify as defined under one 
or both of the above referenced provisions. The error committed by the trial court, 
however, was to then rule that the evidence was admissible without making inquiry 
into the second prong of Rule 804 which reads in relevant part: 
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if 
the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the 
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as 
evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point 
for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can 
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these 
rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the 
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this 
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with 
a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the 
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statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant.7 
The general rule regarding standard of review for rules of evidence is set forth 
in the case of Butler v. Naylor, 987 P.2d 41, 43 (Utah 1999). In that case the court 
held: 
Rules of evidence are interpreted according to general rules of statutory 
construction. See State v. Robertson,932 P.2d 1219, 1228 (Utah 1997). Where 
a rule's language is plain and unambiguous we will not look beyond the rule 
itself for meaning. A trial court errs when it rules contrary to an evidentiary 
rule's plain meaning; 
The specific rule for a trial court in making a ruling on hearsay testimony 
under URE Rule 804(b) requires the court to make an analysis of the proposed 
evidence. See State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah App. 1993). In Horton the 
defendant wanted to introduce an affidavit of a previously deceased Mr. Meinhart at 
trial pursuant to the residual hearsay exception of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 
804(b)(5). The trial court refused to admit the evidence, ruling that because 
Meinhart's wife was available to testify to the same events and there were four other 
witnesses with similar knowledge, Meinhart's affidavit would not be more probative 
than other evidence Horton could obtain. 
In the present case the trial court failed to make a determination as to whether 
or not the statement qualified under Rule 804(b)(5)(A-C). The defendant would 
7
 The defendant believes there is no question that the hearsay did not fit into the category of (1) former testimony, (2) 
statement under belief of impending death, (3) statement against interest, or (4) statement of personal or family 
history. 
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submit that while it may qualify under (A), that it does not meet (B) and (C). 
Detective Weloth testified that Teresa Brown told him that on the night of the 
murder the defendant had told her that he had killed someone, and then shortly 
thereafter told him that he had killed 3 people. There was no inquiry as to whether 
or not the defendant was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs at the time of 
the statement, and no other indication of reliability. The probative value is therefore 
highly suspect. 
Even if the court had made the requisite inquiry, the final requirement of Rule 
804 was not met. The prosecutor, Brandon Maynard, talked to the witness Teresa 
Brown immediately prior to calling her to the stand and discovered that she would 
refuse to testify. He then allowed her to be called to the stand in the presence of the 
jury without informing the trial court or defense counsel of this critical fact. This 
misconduct by the prosecution resulted in a failure of "the proponent of it [to make 
this information] known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or 
hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it" 
(Rule 804(b)(5). Rule 804(b)(5) specifically provides that "a statement may not be 




DID THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENY THE 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER EVIDENCE 
OF PLEA NEGOTIATION WAS PRESENTED TO THE JURY? 
During the 4th day of trial, the State called Detective David Lucas to the stand 
to testify regarding a confession the defendant made while in the county jail on 
October 24, 2000. During voir dire by defense counsel Bouwhuis, the following 
exchange occurred: 
Mr. Bouwhuis: Okay. Did you write down every relevant statement that [the 
Defendant] made? 
Detective Lucas: Yes. I wrote down word for word actually. I said, okay, what do 
you want to say, then I started to write down what he said. He said, "I'm willing to 
plead to first degree murder, but there's two things that I want". 
Defense counsel then makes an objection to the answer on the grounds that the 
statement constituted a plea negotiation. The court then dismissed the jury and made 
an inquiry into the issue. The State proffered that the witness would say the 
defendant then asked for two things in exchange for a plea of guilty.8 The trial judge 
then granted the defense motion to exclude this evidence. The subsequent motion 
for mistrial was denied on the grounds that the defense "solicited [the remark]. The 
court however did give an instruction to the jury. 
8
 The Defendant said he would plead guilty to murder if theft and absconding charges were dropped against a Joey 
Rader and if the prison would give him a TV in his cell at no cost. 
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Rule 410 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in relevant part: 
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is not, in 
any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the defendant who made 
the plea or was a participant in the plea discussions: 
(4) any statement made in the course of plead discussions with an attorney for 
the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which 
result in a plead of guilty later withdrawn. 
The trial court made a finding that this statement was made during the course 
of a plea negation. Unfortunately, the court did not consider whether or not the 
comment "would so likely influence the jury that the defendant cannot be said to 
have had a fair trial" (See State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837,846 (Utah 1999)). In the 
present case the defendant would submit that there could be no more influential 
comment possible than the defendant himself offering to plead guilty to first-degree 
murder. The trial courts decision to deny the timely motion for mistrial is "plainly 
wrong".9 Reasonable minds cannot believe that after hearing this statement a jury 
would not be substantially influenced, making a fair trial impossible. 
POINT V 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERRORS DISCUSSED IN POINTS I-
IV ABOVE CONSTITUTE HARMFUL AND THEREFORE 
REVERSABLE ERROR? 
This is a murder case, a first-degree felony. From a legal standpoint, the 
defendant has alleged a number of errors, the cumulative effect of which has 
9
 See State v. Decorso, 993 P.2d 837,846 (Utah 1999). Abuse of discretion occurs when "a review of the record 
show that the court's decision is plainly wrong in that the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant 
cannot be said to have had a fair trial."(id at 846), (See also State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Utah 1997). 
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resulted in his conviction. From a pragmatic standpoint, these errors have resulted 
in the defendant being incarcerated for what may be the remainder of his life. 
The overall effect of these errors is not unlike what we see in a baseball game. 
An error in the second inning may result in a single run, which in a game with the 
final score of 6-2 may seem insignificant. However, when this second inning error 
and resulting run is added to another single error and resulting run in the fourth 
inning, the fifth inning, the seventh inning, and ninth inning, we have a ballgame 
that is ultimately decided by mistakes. 
If this were simply a baseball game, another loss would go in the books, and 
ultimately be forgotten. But this is not a baseball game, and the consequences of the 
errors have staggering effects. If allowed to stand, this conviction will never be 
forgotten. It will be remembered by Frank Dominguez while serving a life sentence, 
it will be remembered by his family, and it will even be remembered by the family 
of the victim. 
This murder conviction was obtained solely on the confessions of the 
defendant. Although the prosecution spent the better part of a day putting on 
evidence of the crime scene analysis, nothing therein tied the defendant Frank 
Dominguez to the crime. There were no eyewitnesses, no fingerprints, and no 
surveillance videos. The shoe prints found at the scene did not match those of the 
defendant. And finally, the prosecutions gunpowder expert spent several hours on 
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the stand giving the jury no probative evidence. There was no gunpowder anywhere 
on the defendant or his clothing that would be consistent with the prosecution 
theory. The only gunpowder found on the defendant's clothing was a trace amount 
in the inside of his left pants pocket, which again is not consistent with a right-
handed shooter. This trace amount could have been there for several weeks or 
months, and could, as defense counsel argued, been transferred there by the 
defendant who was given the detectives' coat to wear to the scene of the crime. 
What we do have is a series of confused confessions by a defendant, who, by 
all accounts was drunk or high during the time frame of the killing as well as during 
the time many of the confessions were given. These confessions are addressed here 
in the order that they were put on at trial. 
The defendant's grandmother Ricarla Dominguez testified that the defendant 
had told her "that he had killed a man" but she also testified that he always makes 
things up that are not true. 
The defendant's uncle, John Dominguez, testified that while they were 
listening to a news report on the killing at the market, that an intoxicated defendant 
told him that he had done the shooting. John Dominguez was also extremely 
intoxicated at the time of the alleged confession. 
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The next witness Teresa (Terry) Brown refused to testify, so Detective 
Weloth testified that the defendant told her that he had killed either one person or 
three people. 
Detective Minor and Detective Lucas then described a lengthy session in 
which the defendant gives several totally different versions, one of which is a 
confession that he committed the murder. However, this eventual confession is 
confused, and most of the efforts to corroborate his confession fail. He does go to 
the scene and describe the shooting after numerous hours with the detectives, but 
their efforts to locate the remains of the gloves are unsuccessful. Furthermore, the 
efforts to find the alleged gun come up empty, despite explicit directions and a 
personally escorted excursion to its supposed location. 
The defendant then gives another confession to Detective Lucas, which 
testimony the court rules inadmissible as part of a plea negotiation, and asks the jury 
to disregard it. 
Finally, On April 10, 2001 while in prison, the defendant makes a statement 
to Lieutenant Doug Cook, which is overheard by Sergeant Dustin Hardcastle. This 
statement is made while these officers are cutting the defendants clothes off, to put 
him under suicide watch. The defendant, among other things, asks Lieutenant Cook 
to take his handcuffs off, and then says "Cook, some day I'll get my hands on you 
and kill you like I did that other M F ". The prosecution contends that this 
somehow had reference to the murder of October 15, 2000. 
The general rule regarding the determination as to whether or not an error 
requires reversal is that the error must be harmful. See State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 
1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994) for plain error; State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1140 
(Utah 1989) on evidentiary rulings; and State v. Decorso. 993 P.2d 837, 846 (Utah 
1999) for abuse of discretion. For this Court to find that the error is harmful it must 
determine that there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome absent the 
error. The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 920 
(Utah 1987) made an exhaustive analysis of the term reasonable likelihood with the 
conclusion as follows: 
For an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict. This is certainly 
above the "mere possibility' point on the spectrum. If it is "more probable 
than not" that the outcome of trial would have been different, then a court 
cannot possibly place confidence in the verdict. Furthermore, thoughtful 
reflection suggests that confidence in the outcome may be undermined at 
some point substantially short of the "more probable than not" portion of the 
spectrum. It may not be possible to define "reasonable likelihood" much more 
explicitly than this, but the foregoing should be of some assistance in deciding 
whether an error requires reversal. 
The defendant would submit that applying this definition of reasonable 
likelihood to the case at hand requires this Court to combine the detrimental effect 
of all errors in this analysis. The problem with the present case is that we have an 
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abundance of extraneous evidence that was admitted before the jury. There was 
significant prejudicial evidence of the character of the defendant including details of 
his prison stay, details of his parole violation, and testimony of claims of homicidal 
and suicidal periods over a year after the murder in question occurred. Three of the 
six "confessions" were inadmissible, with two of the remaining three being highly 
suspect and internally contradictory. These problems, when coupled with the 
improper and often repeated references to the defendant's character clearly erode 
confidence in the verdict. The result is that these errors constitute harm to the 
defendant and require reversal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the forgoing, there can be no question that the defendant did not 
receive a fair trial. The combination of hearsay testimony, improper character 
evidence and improper plea negotiation statements were prejudicial and damaging. 
The State began with a weak evidentiary case, and attempted to bolster that case 
through a series of improper testimonies and statements calculated to put the 
defendant in the worst light. The cumulative effect of the improperly offered and 
admitted evidence in this case can only be cured by a reversal and remand for a new 
trial. 
DATED this /^aay of September 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appell 
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THE COURT: Have you spoke with the civil side of 
the county attorneys? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I did. 
THE COURT: They called and left a message. I 
didn't want to — it to be ex parte because we couldn't get 
everybody together, so we'll make that record as well. 
All right. Thank you. 
MR. HEWARD: Thanks, Judge. 
(Mr. Heward and Mr. Maynard leave chambers.) 
THE COURT: You two gentlemen will remain for just a 
second? All right. 
(At this time an ex parte hearing is held in chambers 
and the record is sealed under separate cover, after which 
proceedings resume in open court, as follows:) 
THE COURT: All right. This is the time set for 
pretrial conference in the matter of State of Utah versus 
Frank Dominguez. We have made a record of most of the items 
in chambers. Mr. Dominguez was present, both counsel were 
present, and the reporter was there so we just dealt with 
some pretrial issues. 
We now have a motion in limine, I guess, or at least a 
motion of clarification in regards to evidence. 
And Mr. Heward, I believe it is the State's motion. 
MR. HEWARD: It is. Thank you, Your Honor. 
As I indicated briefly in chambers, I spoke with defense 
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counsel a few days ago specifically to ask him whether or not 
it was his intention to keep from the jury the fact that the 
defendant was a parolee at the time that the crime occurred. 
The reason for this inquiry is because of two primary 
matters. 
When the defendant was arrested on the night of the 19th 
of October, he was arrested on an unrelated matter. He 
was — there was a felony warrant for him for absconding out 
based upon his leaving the program Orange Street that he was 
paroled to in Salt Lake County. That had been out for a 
period of time. And the defendant had been in Ogden for a 
period of time and on the lam. 
When he was picked up by law enforcement he initially 
gave a false name as to who he was in an effort to avoid 
being detected for the outstanding warrant. Shortly 
thereafter when — actually not this agent, but an agent from 
AP&P responded because there was another parolee who was 
wanted there, it was confirmed through them that this 
defendant was, in fact — had given a false name and that his 
name was Frank Dominguez and that he was wanted on the 
absconding warrant. 
At that point in time Mr. Dominguez himself initiates a 
contact with law enforcement and says, hey, I have 
information about the murder that happened a few days ago at 
27th and Washington at the Boulevard Market and wanted to 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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provide information to them in exchange for him receiving 
some benefit regarding his parole violation, his absconding 
charge, or both, and then they obviously are separate. 
As a result of that he ended up at the Ogden City Police 
Department, talking initially with Officer Kevin Mann and 
then ultimately with investigator Shane Minor of the county 
attorney's office, and went through a series of stories in 
which he makes incriminating statements, talks about how he 
knows something about this case because someone told him. He 
then changes to he knows something about this case because he 
was there, but didn't do it; and then ultimately admits that 
hefs the one who committed the murder. 
Obviously, in putting on that evidence, there would need 
to be some explanation as to how it is we found the defendant 
and how it is that conversation got started. 
So that was my first question in regards to whether or 
not they were keeping — intending to keep from the jury that 
he was a parolee. And if, in fact, you believe that it!s 
appropriate that we keep that out, we would know how to make 
our opening statement and how to, if you will, instruct the 
officers regarding no referencing the fact that he was a 
parolee. 
The second issue was similar, although different. The 
second issue is that on or about the 10th of April of this 
year, while Mr. Dominguez was at the Utah State Prison, there 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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was an administrative function going on and he became upset 
at one or two of the individuals who were dealing with him 
there. As a result of his becoming upset at them, he made a 
specific reference that both of those officers are prepared 
to testify to, about when I get out of here and I get my 
hands on you Ifll kill you like I did that other mother 
fucker, which in our opinion is nothing more and nothing less 
than a flat out confession to killing the individual here on 
October 15th. 
Obviously we cannot put those people on and go through 
any type of a foundation of who they are and where they work 
and how this statement came about without disclosing that the 
defendant's being housed at the Utah State Prison. 
Those are the two primary issues that we need guidance 
and direction from the Court on as to how to proceed and what 
Your Honor's perception of that is. 
THE COURT: Okay. Response, Mr. Bouwhuis? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: As a general matter, Your Honor, 
it's — it's my position that it's never in a criminal 
defendant's best interest to have more negative evidence come 
before the jury and — and for that reason we oppose it, but 
we recognize the context in which they want it presented to 
the jury. I think the — the first issue of why he came 
into — why he came to be in — in police custody and — and 
gave information and was questioned on this case in the first 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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place, I think that the State can present its evidence 
without having to explain why he was there. 
The second issue, the State chooses to present evidence 
that he made a so-called confession to authorities in the 
prison. Frankly, I don't — if — if they — we don't think 
that that confession is necessary, but I obviously can't — 
we couldn't constrict the State on how it presents its 
evidence and what it presents, if the Court deems it to be 
relevant. 
I mean, my position as defense counsel is that it's 
perhaps more prejudicial than probative, but I've spoken with 
the defendant about it. He understands that that information 
has already been out in the newspapers and so we don't — 
with that, we'd just submit the issue. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HEWARD: I suppose the — the follow-up to that 
is one of the issues that we talked about in chambers has to 
do with the defense's subpoenaing additional individuals. 
That he would — at least if I understand, three of which he 
would call to rebut whether or not the statement that I'm 
talking about made at the prison was made or whatever those 
circumstances were. 
I suppose it would be impossible to put that statement 
on and keep from them where it was made and who it was made 
to, and would be nonsensical beyond that. And then allow the 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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1 defendant to put witnesses on to rebut that to say we are 
2 prison inmates, we were present at the prison on this day and 
3 we didn't hear this. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. In my opinion, the second issue 
5 is the easiest. I think that that comes in — comes in in 
6 the context in which it was made. No one has to go into the 
7 reasons as to why he's being housed there. That's, you know, 
8 irrelevant. The fact is that's where that statement 
9 occurred, that's where his rebuttal witnesses were housed 
10 when they heard it, and I — I just simply think that that 
11 has to be in context. 
12 In regards to the first statement in regards to being on 
13 parole, I don't know why that is necessary, Mr. Heward, 
14 unless I'm missing something. The rules — I do think that, 
15 you know, you can discuss the discussions they had without 
16 necessarily going into why he is on parole or why it was 
17 necessary — now, if they came up in his discussions and he 
18 brought those up, they came up in his discussions. That's 
19 not something — I ruled in a previous armed robbery case, 
20 you can't help what the defendant may have said or not said, 
21 and if they bring those prejudicial things in, I don't think 
22 you have to excise those from your statement. The burden is 
23 on the State not to take advantage of situations or 
24 circumstances. 
25 So in answer to your question, I would allow the 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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discussion. It isn't necessary to explain that he's on 
parole. You just explain the discussion that occurred and 
who was present and what the people were there for. 
MR. HEWARD: And the only issue there becomes that 
he is offering to provide information about this in return 
for receiving consideration on his parole violation. 
THE COURT: And if that's his statement, that comes 
in — 
MR. HEWARD: Okay. 
THE COURT: — if that's the statement that he made. 
You couldn't go out and get that statement and bring it in if 
he hadn't of made it, but — I mean, if he'd have just come 
in and said I want some consideration for my circumstances, 
you would not be able to clarify that statement by saying his 
circumstance is he was on parole. If his statement allegedly 
was, I want some consideration on my parole, then that was 
the statement. The statement is what it is. 
MR. HEWARD: Thank you. And we are — I am more 
than happy to instruct the officer who would be called to 
testify that his — even though that it would be somewhat 
lacking in exactly what happened that — to not specifically 
talk about the parole — 
THE COURT: Correct. 
MR. HEWARD: — as to the discovery of the fact that 
he's on parole ultimately until we get to the issue that the 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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defendant, in fact, says: I have information. If I work 
with you, can you do something for me on the parole 
violation? 
THE COURT: Correct. I — 
MR. HEWARD: All right. 
THE COURT: I think that, you know, all you can do 
is bring up what the defendant brought up. I don't think you 
can paint the picture of everything else. If those were his 
words then — you know, and they're denied by others, I still 
think it goes. 
All right. Anything else? 
MR. HEWARD: May I have just one moment? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(Off-the-record discussion) 
MR. HEWARD: Thank you, Your Honor. That's all. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Bouwhuis, Mr. Heward, if 
you will talk with Deputy Lobato, he has a possible security 
plan to meet our needs that we talked about in chambers. 
MR. HEWARD: And I was going to say — as long as 
Your Honor has raised it — as I made the point, while I 
understand the prison's concerns, I'm not sure the State — 
the county attorney's office is the appropriate party to be 
attempting to restrict that. 
THE COURT: I agree. 
MR. HEWARD: Having said that, I do have to say that 
Laurie Shingle, C.S.R. 
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1 PUNISHMENT ASPECT OF IT. 
2 MR. HEWARD: WE WOULD ASK YOU TO SIMPLY DEFER THAT. 
3 WE WOULD ASK YOU TO MAKE A FINDING THAT BASED UPON HER 
4 REFUSAL TO THE ANSWER THE QUESTIONS IN SPITE OF THE CONTEMPT 
5 THAT SHE BECOME UNAVAILABLE SO WE MAY PUT ON HER PRIOR 
6 STATEMENT TO DETECTIVE WELOTH. 
7 THE COURT: DEFENSE WANT TO BE HEARD? 
8 MR. BOUWHUIS: WELL, WE CERTAINLY DISAGREE WITH 
9 THAT. IT'S NOT ANYTHING THAT WE HAVE DONE. I AM 
10 CONCERNED -- SO WE DO OBJECT TO THAT, FOR THE RECORD. 
11 I HAVE ONE CONCERN THAT PERHAPS CAN BE RESOLVED BEFORE 
12 MS. BROWN IS TRANSPORTED BACK, AND THAT IS THE IMPLICATION OF 
13 THE QUESTION ASKED BY MR. HEWARD IF SHE WAS THREATENED. I 
14 DON'T KNOW AND I'M CERTAINLY NOT PREJUDGING ANYTHING, BUT I 
15 DON'T HAVE ANY INFORMATION THAT SHE WAS IN FACT THREATENED, 
16 BUT THE JURY HEARD THE QUESTION. 
17 SO UNLESS THERE'S SOME EVIDENCE TO SHOW OR SOMETHING TO 
18 SHOW THAT SHE WAS IN FACT THREATENED AND THAT'S WHY SHE'S NOT 
19 TESTIFYING, RATHER THAN JUST A GENERAL FEAR THE PRISONERS AT 
20 THE PRISON HAVE, I WOULD ASK THAT THAT REMARK OR THAT 
21 QUESTION BE STRICKEN AND THE JURY BE INSTRUCTED TO DISREGARD 
22 THAT QUESTION BECAUSE IN FACT THERE IS NO — AND I'M ASSUMING 
23 THAT THERE ISN'T ANYTHING, I DON'T KNOW. 
24 MR. HEWARD: NO, THERE IS. IF YOU'D LIKE ME TO PUT 



























THE COURT: WELL — 
MR. HEWARD: IN FACT, WE CAN USE YOUR OWN BAILIFF 
WHO WAS THE ONE WHO INFORMED ME THIS MORNING THAT BECAUSE OF 
THREATS SHE WAS GOING TO REFUSE TO TESTIFY. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. YOU MAY TAKE MS. BROWN OUT, 
BUT PLEASE DETAIN HER. MR. BOUWHUIS HAS MADE A REQUEST TO 
STRIKE THAT. MR. HEWARD, YOU MAY NOW MAKE YOUR RECORD AS TO 
THERE BEING A VALID BASIS FOR THAT. 
MR. HEWARD: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. AND ACTUALLY, 
WHY DON'T I LET MR. MAYNARD DO IT. ANTICIPATING THAT I WAS 
GOING TO TAKE THIS WITNESS, MR. MAYNARD AT THE BREAK WITH 
DETECTIVE WELOTH WENT AND MET MS. BROWN NEXT FLOOR UP IN YOUR 
SECURE AREA AND IN WHICH MS. BROWN MADE A VERY DETAILED 
RECORD OF HER REASONS FOR REFUSING TO TESTIFY. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. MR. MAYNARD? 
MR. MAYNARD: YOUR HONOR, YES, AT THAT BREAK I WENT 
UPSTAIRS AND HAD A CONVERSATION WITH RITA — OR EXCUSE ME, 
WITH TERRY, DETECTIVE WELOTH WAS WITH ME. I WENT THROUGH HER 
STATEMENT AS. SHE HAD GIVEN IT TO HIM ON A PRIOR OCCASION, 
ASKED HER IF THOSE THINGS WERE ACCURATE; IF SHE HAD A 
CONVERSATION WITH THE DEFENDANT, IF SHE RECOGNIZED THE 
DEFENDANT, AND SHE INDICATED THAT SHE DID. THAT SHE HAD IN 
FACT TALKED WITH HIM, THAT HE ADMITTED, SAID THAT HE HAD 
KILLED SOMEONE AND THAT HE WASN'T JOKING AROUND, THAT HE 
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ADMITTED THIS IN FRONT OF HIS AUNT AS HE WAS CRYING AT 2 9TH 
AND JACKSON. 
I THEN ASKED HER IF SHE WOULD TESTIFY AND SHE SAID I DO 
NOT WANT TO AND I SAID WHY IS THAT. SHE SAID BECAUSE I HAVE 
BEEN THREATENED AND I SAID WHEN WERE YOU THREATENED AND BY 
WHOM. SHE GAVE ME THE FIRST NAME OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS IN 
PRISON WITH HER BY THE NAME OF JUANITA, I DID NOT GET A LAST 
NAME. SHE — AND I'M NOT QUITE SURE AS TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
SURROUNDING WHAT THAT WAS, SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT IT'S 
JUST NOT GOOD FOR YOU TO TESTIFY. AND THEN COMING DOWN HERE 
BEING TRANSPORTED, I BELIEVE ONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS WAS JAKE 
ABLEMAN OR JACOB ABLEMAN, AND I'M NOT SURE WHO THE OTHER ONE 
WAS, AS THEY WERE BEING TRANSPORTED DOWN, TWO OTHER GUYS HAD 
MADE STATEMENTS TO HER, AND LIKE I SAID, THOSE ARE ALSO VAGUE 
BUT SHE SAID IT WAS NOT IN HER BEST INTEREST TO TESTIFY, 
SOMETHING TO THAT EFFECT. 
THE COURT: MR. BOUWHUIS, YOUR RESPONSE? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: AND THAT IS A CONCERN I HAVE THAT THE 
QUESTION IF SIMPLY LEFT UNCLARIFIED IMPLIES THAT THE 
DEFENDANT THREATENED MS. BROWN OR THAT HE INDIRECTLY 
THREATENED HER. AND IT APPEARS -- AND WE HAD NO IDEA SHE WAS 
ON THE WITNESS LIST FOR THE STATE UNTIL TUESDAY. AND IT 
APPEARS THAT OTHER PRISONERS ARE SIMPLY TELLING HER, YOU KNOW 
WHAT THE SCORE IS, YOU TESTIFY AGAINST SOMEBODY ELSE IN 
PRISON, THERE'S GOING TO BE TROUBLE FOR YOU. 
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AND WE WOULD ASK — I MEAN, OBVIOUSLY THERE IS A 
GOOD-FAITH BASIS TO ASK THE QUESTION. THE PROBLEM THAT WE 
HAVE IS THAT IF IT'S LEFT UNCLARIFIED LEAVES THE IMPRESSION 
THAT THE DEFENDANT MAKES SPECIFIC THREATS TO HER AND IT 
SOUNDS LIKE THAT HE DID NOT. THAT OTHER PRISONERS WERE 
TELLING HER THIS IS NOT GOOD FOR YOU IF YOU TESTIFY. 
THE COURT: RESPONSE? 
MR. HEWARD: WE DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEMS AT ALL IN 
YOUR HONOR CLARIFYING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT THE ONE OR 
HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE FACT THAT SHE MAY HAVE BEEN 
THREATENED AND HER REASON FOR REFUSING TO TESTIFY. WE DON'T 
HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THAT AT ALL. 
THE COURT: OKAY. HOW DO YOU WANT ME TO WORD IT? 
THE BOTTOM LINE IS THE QUESTION WAS, WERE YOU THREATENED AND 
THAT WAS A YES OR NO QUESTION. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: YES. 
THE COURT: YOU ALL ARE NOW REACHING TO DRAW 
INFERENCES THAT COULD BE REACHED FROM AN AMBIGUOUS QUESTION. 
THERE WAS A FACTUAL BASIS THAT ESTABLISHES THAT THE STATE HAD 
GOOD FAITH IN ASKING THAT QUESTION. NOW YOU ALL WANT ME TO 
READ INTO IT MORE THAN WHAT IS TESTIFIED TO. THE QUESTION 
WAS WERE YOU THREATENED, SHE SAID, I BELIEVE, YES. I DON'T 
KNOW, I'LL HAVE TO DEFER TO MS. COVINGTON ON HER NOTE THAT 
BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW WHAT HER RESPONSE WAS AND THEN WE MOVED 
ON. IT WAS NOT A SPECIFIC QUESTION WHICH I THOUGHT WOULD 
WOULD YOU CHECK, MS. COVINGTON, TO SEE WHETHER OR NOT SHE 
ANSWERED THAT? 
(PAGE 117 LINES 3-13 WERE READ BACK INTO THE RECORD.) 
THE COURT: SO I'LL REPEAT TO THE JURY I'LL DRAW 
THEIR ATTENTION TO THE QUESTION, HAS SOMEONE THREATENED YOU, 
MA'AM, SHE RESPONDED YES. AND THEN MY STATEMENT THAT THREATS 
DID NOT COME DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FROM THE DEFENDANT. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: THANK YOU, JUDGE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. NOW, IN REGARDS TO THE 
RULING IN REGARDS TO UNAVAILABILITY. I AM MAKING A SPECIFIC 
FINDING UNDER THE RULE THAT SHE IS UNAVAILABLE. SHE WAS 
ASKED THE QUESTION MORE THAN ONCE, IN EACH INSTANCE SHE 
REFUSED, IN EACH INSTANCE SHE INDICATED SHE HAD SPOKEN TO AN 
ATTORNEY AND THAT THE ATTORNEY ADVISED HER NOT TO. UNLESS 
COUNSEL, AND I KNOW YOU'RE NOT HER LAWYER, CAN THINK OF ANY 
OTHER PRIVILEGE, THE ONLY PRIVILEGE THAT SHE HAS A RIGHT TO 
EXERCISE IS HER FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE. I'VE BEEN ADVISED 
BY PROFFER THAT NOTHING IN THESE STATEMENTS WOULD INCRIMINATE 
HER. I TWICE DIRECTED HER TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS, SHE TWICE 
REFUSED. SECOND TIME, UPON A REQUEST FROM THE PROSECUTION, I 
ADVISED HER ONE MORE TIME, SHE REFUSED TO ANSWER THE 
QUESTION. I MADE A FINDING THAT SHE WAS WILLFULLY REFUSING 
TO ANSWER THE QUESTION AND HELD HER IN CONTEMPT. AT WHICH 
POINT AFTER THAT FINDING WE BROKE BECAUSE SHE IS ENTITLED TO 
TALK TO HER COUNSEL BEFORE HAVING A HEARING FOR IMPOSITION 
1 FOR THE CONTEMPT, THAT NOW MAKES HER UNAVAILABLE AS A WITNESS 
2 BECAUSE SHE HAS REFUSED TO TESTIFY. AND SO I THINK THE STATE 
3 WOULD BE ALLOWED AT THIS POINT TO CALL OFFICER WELQTH AND 
4 RELATE THOSE STATEMENTS. 
5 MR. BOUWHUIS: I JUST WANT THE RECORD TO BE CLEAR 
6 THAT WE'VE OBJECTED JUST IN CASE THERE IS AN ISSUE. 
7 THE COURT: AND THE RECORD WILL REFLECT THAT YOU 
8 HAVE OBJECTED. ALL RIGHT. WITH THAT, ANYTHING ELSE WE NEED 
9 TO COVER? DO WE NEED TO COME BACK EARLY? WE DON'T HAVE ANY 
10 LEGAL ISSUES SO I'LL SEE YOU BACK AT 1:30. ALL RIGHT. WE'LL 
11 BE IN RECESS. 
12 (A LUNCH RECESS WAS TAKEN.) 
13 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I TRUST EVERYBODY HAD A GOOD 
14 LUNCH. THE RECORD WILL REFLECT MR. DOMINGUEZ IS HERE, ALL 
15 COUNSEL ARE BACK. WE'RE GOING TO CALL THE JURY BACK, BUT 
16 BEFORE DOING SO, COUNSEL, MS. COVINGTON AND I OVER THE BREAK 
17 WENT BACK AND REREAD THAT PROVISION THAT WE TALKED ABOUT 
18 BEFORE IN REGARDS TO MS. BROWN. 
19 THE QUESTION WAS PUT TO MS. BROWN HAS SOMEONE THREATENED 
20 YOU, MA'AM. AND THEN MR. HEWARD ASKED HER A SERIES OF 
21 QUESTIONS, THREE, I BELIEVE IS WHAT WE DETERMINED IN REGARDS 
22 TO OFFICER WELOTH." UPON REFLECTION, I'M NOT SO SURE AS I WAS 
23 WHEN I FIRST HEARD IT THAT THE YES IS IN REFERENCE TO THE 
24 FACT THAT SHE WAS THREATENED OR THE YES WAS IN REFLECTION TO 
25 THE TWO QUESTIONS THAT HE PUT TO HER ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT SHE 
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PLAY IT SAFE I WANTED TO MAKE SURE HE WAS INITIATING 
THIS . 
MR. BOUWHUIS: NEVERTHELESS, YOU DID NOT KNOW 
OF YOURSELF WHETHER OR NOT HE HAD AN ATTORNEY? 
THE WITNESS: I WOULD SAY I'M ABOUT 90 PERCENT 
SURE, BECAUSE IT SEEMED LIKE I HEARD THE NAME OF A 
LAWYER, BUT I CAN'T REMEMBER WHAT THE NAME WAS THAT WAS 
REPRESENTING HIM. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: NEVERTHELESS YOU PROCEEDED AND 
ON THE SECOND PAGE YOU WROTE DOWN THE STATEMENTS THAT HE 
MADE? 
THE WITNESS: YES, AFTER HE WAIVED HIS RIGHTS. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: OKAY. DID YOU WRITE DOWN EVERY 
RELEVANT STATEMENT THAT HE MADE? 
THE WITNESS: YES. I WROTE DOWN WORD FOR WORD 
ACTUALLY. I SAID, OKAY, WHAT DO YOU WANT TO SAY, THEN 
I STARTED TO WRITE DOWN WHAT HE SAID. HE SAID I'M 
WILLING TO PLEAD TO FIRST DEGREE MURDER, BUT THERE'S TWO 
THINGS THAT I WANT. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: AT THIS POINT I'LL ASK YOU, IT'S 
TRUE, IS IT NOT, THAT HE DID NOT ACTUALLY CONFESS TO 
MURDER IN THE SENSE THAT HE SAID I MURDERED SOMEONE? 
MR. HEWARD: WHERE IS THE VOIR DIRE? 
THE COURT: I AGREE. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: THIS IS IT, JUDGE. IF THE 
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DEFENDANT DID NOT CONFESS TO ANYTHING -- THIS APPEARS TO 
BE AN ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE AND THAT IS NOT ADMISSIBLE. 
FROM ALL APPEARANCES, THE DEFENDANT WAS REPRESENTING 
HIMSELF AS HIS OWN ATTORNEY. ANY ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE 
IS INADMISSIBLE TO THE JURY. FROM MY READING OF THE 
SECOND PAGE THERE'S NO CONFESSION HERE, ONLY AN ATTEMPT 
TO NEGOTIATE A PLEA. 
MR. HEWARD: THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT 
DOESN'T SAY I'M GUILTY WE DO NOT BELIEVE DOESN'T MEAN 
THAT THIS ISN'T A CONFESSION. HE SAID, AS DETECTIVE 
LUCAS SAID, I'M WILLING TO PLEAD GUILTY TO FIRST DEGREE 
MURDER. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: IN EXCHANGE FOR OTHER FAVORS. 
THAT IS AN ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE A PLEA AND IS NOT 
ADMISSIBLE. 
THE COURT: WE'LL TAKE A SHORT RECESS, LADIES 
AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY. I NEED TO TAKE FURTHER 
DISCUSSION ON THIS MATTER OUTSIDE YOUR PRESENCE. IF 
YOU'LL STEP BACK WITH THE DEPUTY. PLEASE DO NOT DISCUSS 
THIS CASE AMONG YOURSELVES OR WITH ONE ANOTHER. WE'LL 
BRING YOU BACK IN A FEW MINUTES. 
(JURY OUT OF THE COURTROOM.) 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. MR. HEWARD, MAY I HAVE 
A PROFFER FROM THE STATE AS TO WHAT YOU INTEND THIS 
EVIDENCE TO SHOW? 
34 
MR. HEWARD: YOUR HONOR, THE DOCUMENT ITSELF 
SAYS I'M WILLING TO PLEAD GUILTY TO FIRST DEGREE MURDER. 
THERE ARE TWO THINGS THAT I WANT. LUCAS SAYS I CAN'T 
MAKE ANY DEALS. THE DEFENDANT SAYS BUT YOU CAN TALK TO 
THE COUNTY ATTORNEY. THE DOCUMENT ITSELF THEN SAYS WENT 
TO CALL ATTORNEY BILL DAINES. IT SHOWS A TIME. 
THEN HE COMES BACK AND LUCAS ASKS WHAT TWO THINGS DO 
YOU WANT WHILE ATTORNEY IS RESEARCHING YOUR REQUEST. 
ONE, WANT CHARGES DROPPED AGAINST JOEY RADER FROM 
ABSCONDING AND RETAIL THEFT. TWO, WHEN I GO BACK TO 
PRISON THAT THEY ALLOW ME TO HAVE T.V. IN MY CELL FOR NO 
MONEY. THE DEFENDANT CONTINUES, WITH THOSE TWO REQUESTS 
I WILL PLEAD GUILTY TOMORROW OR THE NEXT SOONEST COURT 
DATE. I UNDERSTAND THE REQUEST THAT I'M MAKING IS A 
SENTENCE OF LIFE AND I'M WILLING TO DO THAT. SIGNED 
FRANK LYLE DOMINQUEZ. 
LUCAS COMES BACK AND IT SAYS RETURNED. CANNOT DO 
ANYTHING WITHOUT A LAWYER WITH YOU. DO YOU UNDERSTAND 
AND WILL YOU WAIT FOR YOUR LAWYER. THE DEFENDANT 
ANSWERS YES. SIGNED BY RODEFER, SIGNED BY LUCAS, SIGNED 
BY THE DEFENDANT. 
THE COURT: YOUR RESPONSE. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: YOUR HONOR, IT'S STILL NOT CLEAR 
WHETHER OR NOT HE WAS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL AT THIS 
POINT. BUT EVEN IF HE WAS HE WAS AT THIS TIME ACTING IN 
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A CAPACITY AS CO-COUNSEL. IT'S STILL AN ATTEMPT TO 
NEGOTIATE AND THAT'S NOT ADMISSIBLE. THERE'S NO 
CONFESSION HERE, EVEN THOUGH SOMEBODY USED THE WORD 
CONFESSION. WE DON'T HAVE ANY INFORMATION IT WAS -- WE 
HAVE SOME ALLEGATION THAT THE DEFENDANT SAID HE WANTED 
TO CONFESS, BUT THE FACT IS HE NEVER DID CONFESS AND 
HERE HE'S OFFERING TO PLEAD IN EXCHANGE FOR FAVORS. 
THE COURT: WHAT RULE ARE WE LOOKING AT? 410? 
MR. HEWARD: YES. THE POINT IS, JUDGE, THAT 
THESE AREN'T PLEA NEGOTIATIONS. THE DEFENDANT IS SAYING 
THIS IS WHAT I'M WILLING TO DO. THERE'S NO NEGOTIATION 
FROM THE OTHER SIDE. IN FACT, LUCAS SPECIFICALLY SAYS I 
CAN'T MAKE ANY DEALS. 
THE COURT: LET ME FINISH READING THE RULE. 
(PAUSE IN THE PROCEEDINGS.) 
THE COURT: ANY FURTHER ARGUMENT EITHER ONE 
WANTS TO MAKE? 
MR. BOUWHUIS: JUST ONE FURTHER THING. IT 
APPEARS THAT THE RULE UNDER SUBSECTION FOUR INDICATES 
THE DISCUSSIONS HAVE TO BE WITH AN ATTORNEY WITH 
PROSECUTING AUTHORITY. MY ARGUMENT WOULD BE THAT 
DETECTIVE LUCAS WAS ACTING AS AN AGENT FOR BILL DAINES, 
WHO IS THE COUNTY ATTORNEY, OR WITH THE COUNTY 
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. THE DOCUMENT INDICATES THAT MR. 
LUCAS, OR DETECTIVE LUCAS, CONSULTED WITH BILL DAINES 
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REGARDING THIS MATTER. THEREFORE WE ARGUE THERE IS AN 
AGENCY RELATIONSHIP THERE AND FALLS UNDER THIS RULE AND 
IS INADMISSIBLE. 
MR. HEWARD: WE BELIEVE THAT IT APPLIES 
SPECIFICALLY TO PLEA DISCUSSIONS WITH AN ATTORNEY WITH 
PROSECUTING AUTHORITY. DETECTIVE LUCAS IS AN OGDEN CITY 
DETECTIVE. HE IS NOT SUPERVISED, HE IS NOT PAID, HE IS 
NOT AN AGENT. WE DO NOT HAVE ANY ABILITY TO CONTROL 
HIM. THE FACT THAT HE CONSULTS WITH MR. DAINES CANNOT 
MAKE HIM AN AGENT OF THE WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. 
THE RULE SPECIFICALLY SAYS PLEA DISCUSSIONS WITH AN 
ATTORNEY FOR THE PROSECUTING AUTHORITY. 
THE COURT: I'LL GRANT THE DEFENSE'S MOTION. I 
THINK IT IS IN VIOLATION OF RULE 410. RULE 410 
PROHIBITS ANY KIND OF DISCUSSION ABOUT PLEA NEGOTIATIONS, 
WHETHER THEY'RE SELF-GENERATED OR NOT GENERATED BY 
MR. DOMINGUEZ. HE CALLED OVER OFFICER LUCAS AND WANTED 
TO ENTER INTO A PLEA DISCUSSION WITH OFFICER LUCAS. HE 
INDICATED THAT HE WOULD PLEAD GUILTY IN RETURN FOR 
CERTAIN THINGS. OFFICER LUCAS THEN CONTACTED A 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. 
THE FACT THAT THEY DENIED HIS REQUEST AND TOLD HIM THEY 
WOULD NOT MEET THAT REQUEST, IN MY OPINION STILL DOESN'T 
TAKE IT OUTSIDE THE RULE. 
I'M RELYING PRIMARILY UPON RULE 410, SECTION FOUR, 
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THAT SAYS "ANY STATEMENT MADE IN THE COURSE OF PLEA 
DISCUSSIONS WITH AN ATTORNEY FOR THE PROSECUTING 
AUTHORITY, WHICH DO NOT RESULT IN A PLEA OF GUILTY OR 
WHICH RESULT IN A PLEA OF GUILTY LATER WITHDRAWN ARE 
INADMISSIBLE. THIS WAS CLEARLY A PLEA DISCUSSION. AND 
WHILE IT WAS GENERATED BY MR. DOMINGUEZ THAT'S WHAT IT 
WAS STILL. 
THE REQUEST WAS MADE TO OFFICER LUCAS. OFFICER 
LUCAS HAD TO CONSULT WITH THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
IN THAT PARTICULAR SITUATION. WHILE THE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
WAS NOT PRESENT, THE MESSAGE WAS DONE THAT THERE IS NO 
PLEA DISCUSSION HERE. IT WAS CLEARLY CONDITIONAL ON MR. 
DOMINGUEZ'S BEHALF. HE SAID HE WOULD PLEAD GUILTY IF 
CERTAIN THINGS WERE MET. THOSE THINGS WERE REJECTED BY 
OFFICER LUCAS AND BY THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. I 
GRANT THE MOTION OF THE DEFENSE. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: THANK YOU. WE DO HAVE ONE 
FURTHER MOTION. WE WOULD MOVE FOR A MISTRIAL BASED ON 
THE FACT THAT DETECTIVE LUCAS IN FACT STATED THAT THE 
DEFENDANT WAS WILLING TO PLEAD TO FIRST DEGREE MURDER. 
IT'S CLEARLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT AND WE WOULD 
ASK FOR A MISTRIAL. 
THE COURT: A RESPONSE. 
MR. HEWARD: PREJUDICE ISN'T THE TEST, YOUR 
HONOR. WE'LL SUBMIT IT BASED ON THAT. IN FACT, THE 
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VOIR DIRE CAME FROM DEFENSE COUNSEL THAT GOT THE RESPONSE 
THE COURT: IT DID. I'LL DENY THAT MOTION. 
YOU SOLICITED THAT. BOTH OF YOU TAKE A RISK WHEN YOU 
DECIDE TO MAKE THESE KINDS OF DETERMINATIONS BEFORE THE 
JURY. I THINK THIS IS SOMETHING THAT WE SHOULD HAVE 
TAKEN OUTSIDE THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY. 
I DIDN'T SEE IT COMING. IT WAS CHARACTERIZED AS A 
CONFESSION. IT WASN'T UNTIL YOU GOT TWO-THIRDS THE WAY 
THROUGH YOUR VOIR DIRE THAT I REALIZED THAT THIS MAY BE 
UNDER RULE 410, BUT IT'S NOT MY JOB TO PROTECT EITHER 
SIDE FROM THEMSELVES IN THIS PARTICULAR SITUATION. 
EITHER ONE OF YOU COULD HAVE ASKED TO HAVE THE JURY 
EXCUSED AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME. THE STATE HAS ALWAYS 
ADDRESSED THIS AS BEING A CONFESSION. IT IS THE DEFENSE 
THAT BROUGHT UP THE ISSUE THAT IT MAY BE INADMISSIBLE 
BY WAY OF A PLEA DISCUSSION OR NEGOTIATION. THE MOTION 
FOR MISTRIAL IS DENIED. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I WANT THE RECORD TO REFLECT 
THAT DETECTIVE LUCAS'S OFFER OF I'M WILLING TO PLEAD 
GUILTY TO FIRST DEGREE MURDER WAS NOT IN RESPONSE OF THE 
QUESTION DID HE EVER CONFESS. THE ANSWER SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN YES OR NO. IT WASN'T. HE OFFERED THAT OF HIS OWN 
VOLITION. GRANTED THERE'S SOME GRAY AREA THERE BECAUSE 
I WAS CONDUCTING THE VOIR DIRE, BUT HIS RESPONSE WAS 
25 I NONRESPONSIVE AND HE IS THE STATE'S WITNESS. 
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THE COURT: THAT OBJECTION COMES AFTER THE 
FACT. LIKE I SAID, BOTH SIDES RUN A GREAT DEAL OF RISK 
ON SOMETHING THAT IS WHAT I CONSIDER TO BE, YOU KNOW, 
CONTROVERSIAL IN THE SENSE OF WHETHER OR NOT IT'S 
ADMISSIBLE IN FRONT OF THE JURY OR NOT. AT ANY TIME 
EITHER ONE OF YOU COULD HAVE FORWARNED THIS COURT THAT 
IT WAS COMING AND ASK TO EXCUSE THE JURY AND DONE THIS 
OUT OF THEIR PRESENCE. IF YOU WANT A CURATIVE 
INSTRUCTION I'LL GIVE YOU ONE, BUT I'LL DENY THE MOTION 
FOR A MISTRIAL. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I WOULD ASK THAT THE STATEMENT 
BE STRICKEN AND THE JURY SO INSTRUCTED. 
MR. HEWARD: IF THE DEFENDANT TAKES THE STAND, 
IS YOUR HONOR RULING THAT WE ARE NOT ALLOWED TO 
CROSS-EXAMINE HIM BASED ON THIS STATEMENT? 
THE COURT: NO. THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF 
PARAGRAPH NUMBER FOUR STATES THAT "SUCH STATEMENT IS 
ADMISSIBLE IN ANY PROCEEDING WHEREIN ANOTHER STATEMENT 
MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE SAME PLEA OR PLEA NEGOTIATIONS 
HAS BEEN INTRODUCED AND THE STATEMENT OUGHT IN FAIRNESS 
TO BE CONSIDERED CONTEMPORANEOUS WITH IT." I'VE NOT 
ALLOWED ANY STATEMENT IN. 
OR, TWO, "IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING FOR PERJURY OR 
FALSE STATEMENT, IF THE STATEMENT WAS MADE BY THE 
DEFENDANT UNDER OATH ON THE RECORD AND IN THE PRESENCE 
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OF COUNSEL." SO IT DEPENDS UPON WHETHER OR NOT HE TAKES 
THE STAND AND DENIES OR WHAT HIS STATEMENTS ARE. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: I CAN CERTAINLY INDICATE TO THE 
COURT AND THE STATE RIGHT NOW THAT I HAVE NO INTENTION 
OF ASKING THE DEFENDANT ABOUT THAT CONVERSATION. 
MR. HEWARD: BUT THAT DOESN'T STOP US FROM 
GOING INTO THE FACT THAT WE HAVE A SIGNED STATEMENT FROM 
THE DEFENDANT REGARDING THIS CASE. 
MR. BOUWHUIS: NO. 
THE COURT: THE DIFFICULTY I'VE GOT IS THE 
WHOLE THING IS COLORED. IT WAS A PLEA DISCUSSION AND IS 
CLEARLY PROHIBITED BY THE RULE. WE'LL WAIT AND SEE HOW 
THE TESTIMONY COMES DOWN, MR. HEWARD, BUT IT WAS CLEARLY 
A PLEA DISCUSSION. WHETHER HE GENERATED IT OR WHATEVER, 
IT WAS CLEARLY A PLEA DISCUSSION AND NOT THE TYPE OF 
THING -- IT'S SIMILAR TO THE FACT THAT WE DON'T GET INTO 
INSURANCE OR NEGOTIATIONS THAT OCCUR IN CIVIL CASES AS 
WELL. SO AT THIS POINT I DON'T THINK IT'S ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, BUT I'M NOT RULING ON THAT 
UNTIL WE GET THERE. 
CAN WE BRING BACK IN THE JURY? 
MR. MAYNARD: YOUR HONOR, IF WE COULD TAKE A 
FEW MINUTES TO FIGURE OUT WHERE TO HEAD NEXT? 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WE'LL TAKE A SHORT 
RECESS. 
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1. MURDER - 1st Degree Felony 
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SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendants conviction of MURDER a 1st Degree Felony, 
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less 
than six years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
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SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The defendant is granted credit for the time he has served on this 
case. The time to run consecutive to the time he is currently 
serving at the prison, 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
Court recommends to the Board of Pardons that the defendant be 
responsible for restitution when released. 
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